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Gary Pulsinelli*

In *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows*, author J.K. Rowling attributes to goblins an intriguing view of ownership rights in artistic works. According to Rowling, goblins believe that the maker of an artistic object maintains an ongoing ownership interest in that object even after it is sold, and is entitled to get it back when the purchaser dies. While this view may strike some as rather odd when it is applied to tangible property in our “Muggle” world, it actually has some very interesting parallels to the legal treatment of intangible property, particularly in the areas of intellectual property and moral rights. The first part of this essay lays out the goblin view of property, and the second part then examines some of the parallels between that view and Muggle law.

The third part of this essay explores the question of whether we Muggles are becoming goblins. The ways in which the parallels between our law and the goblin view have been developing and growing suggest that we are becoming more goblinish in our willingness to recognize ongoing rights in artistic objects, including allowing the artist to collect a commission on subsequent resale of the work. Practical and social considerations suggest that we are unlikely to go as far as recognizing a permanent personal right in the creator that lets him or her reclaim such an object after a sale or other transfer is made. However, we are moving closer to recognizing some forms of the collective property right that the goblins actually seem to demand, a cultural moral right in important cultural objects that enables the descendants of that culture as a group to demand the return of the object. Thus, we Muggles may not be as far from the goblins as we may have at first believed.

**The Goblin View of Ownership**

In *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows*, Harry and his friends have enlisted the assistance of the goblin Griphook in planning and executing a dangerous scheme. In exchange for Griphook’s help, Harry has promised to give him a sword of goblin manufacture, the sword of Godric Gryffindor, which is currently in Harry’s possession. Harry’s friend Bill Weasley, who is not in on the scheme but who has worked closely with goblins for many years, pulls Harry aside to warn him about the risks of making bargains with goblins, “most particularly if that bargain

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2 Id. at 516-17.
3 The term “Muggle,” in Harry’s Wizarding world, refers to a non-magical human. I borrow the term here to refer to aspects of the real, mundane world we (at least most of us) inhabit. The term also brings out an interesting point related to the capitalization of group names. For simplicity, this essay follows Rowling’s convention of always capitalizing “Muggle,” never capitalizing “goblin,” and capitalizing “wizard” only when refer to Wizards as a cultural group. Arguably, the last rule should be followed in all cases—lower case when referring to an individual, upper case when referring to a group or cultural identity. Indeed, Rowling’s failure to capitalize her references Goblin culture might be interpreted as reflecting a very Wizard-centric (wizard-centric?) view of the world, one that relegates Goblin culture to a lower status.
4 Although I will assume that the reader has either read the book or does not intend to do so, I will try to provide as little in the way of “spoilers” as is consistent with making my point.
involves treasure.”5 Bill notes that “Goblin notions of ownership, payment, and repayment are not the same as human ones,”6 then goes on to explain the source of his concern:

“[T]here is a belief among some goblins . . . that wizards cannot be trusted in matters of gold and treasure, that they have no respect for goblin ownership.”

“I respect—” Harry began, but Bill shook his head.

“You don’t understand, Harry, nobody could understand unless they have lived with goblins. To a goblin, the rightful and true master of any object is the maker, not the purchaser. All goblin-made objects are, in goblin eyes, rightfully theirs.”

“But if it was bought—”

“—then they would consider it rented by the ones who had paid the money. They have, however, great difficulty with the idea of goblin-made objects passing from wizard to wizard. You saw Griphook’s face when the tiara passed under his eyes. He disapproves. I believe he thinks, as do the fiercest of his kind, that it ought to have been returned to the goblins once the original purchaser died. They consider our habit of keeping goblin-made objects, passing them from wizard to wizard without further payment, little more than theft.”7

Thus, according to Bill, goblins believe that the individual creator of a tangible artistic object maintains an ongoing property interest in that object.

An earlier passage in the story presages this discussion of goblin views, in an exchange involving a beautiful tiara owned by Bill’s Aunt Muriel:

Fleur [Bill’s wife] drew out a worn velvet case, which she opened to show the wandmaker. The tiara sat glittering and twinkling in the light from the low-hanging lamp.

“Moonstones and diamonds,” said Griphook, who had sidled into the room without Harry noticing. “Made by goblins, I think?”

“And paid for by wizards,” said Bill quietly, and the goblin shot him a look that was both furtive and challenging.8

Griphook thus appears to covet the return of this goblin-made tiara, in addition to the sword, and Bill responds by asserting his wizard family’s claim to it.

However, Griphook’s actual words and actions do not entirely support this view of goblin beliefs, instead suggesting what would seem to be a somewhat different conception. Griphook’s words and actions pertain only to the rights of goblins as a race (or cultural group) to artistic works created by earlier goblin artisans. The two main artistic objects at issue, the sword and the tiara, are both at least several centuries old.9 Griphook makes no reference to knowing the particular creator of either piece, or being descended from any such creator; rather, he makes his claim on behalf of the goblins as a group. For example, regarding the sword, he says he wants it

5 Id. at 516.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 517.
8 Id. at 512.
9 See id. at 505-06 (discussing the acquisition of the sword by Godric Gryffindor, who had lived “over a thousand years ago,” J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS 150 (1998) [hereinafter CHAMBER OF SECRETS]); id. at 141 (according to Bill’s Aunt Muriel, the tiara has “been in my family for centuries.”).
back because, “It is a lost treasure, a masterpiece of goblinwork! It belongs with the goblins!”

Thus, he is not espousing precisely the continuing relationship to the artistic object that Bill
ascribes to the goblins, but rather a right to have important cultural artifacts returned to the
descendants of their creators as a cultural group. Furthermore, Bill’s assertion of what goblins
believe implies a somewhat more economic motive, in that what they seem to desire is a new
payment made to the goblins for each subsequent transfer. In contrast, Griphook seems to desire
return of the object itself, because of its importance as a cultural artifact.

Because the only artifacts explicitly discussed are both ancient, the book provides no direct
evidence of Griphook’s views regarding more recent objects of goblin craftsmanship. Given this
gap in knowledge, the two pronouncements are not necessarily inconsistent, and they may be
reconcilable. For example, goblins might view a particular object as belonging to the individual
creator for his or her lifetime (and perhaps some extended time thereafter), for the economic
benefit of that creator, and then falling into possession of the goblins as a group, because of its
continuing importance as a cultural artifact. In any case, the two views have somewhat different
parallels in Muggle law, and I will discuss them separately where relevant.

Parallels to Ownership under Muggle Law

Tangible Property Law

This view of property ownership that asserts an ongoing ownership right in an object sold to
another seems least like Muggle law when considered in terms of the rules of ownership interests
in tangible property. In general, we Muggles expect to be able to do as we wish with objects we
purchase, including reselling them or otherwise passing them on as we see fit.

Actually, under Muggle law, the maker of an object could fashion the relationship to that object that Bill
describes, by granting the purchaser a life estate in the object, with the maker retaining the

10 Id. at 506.

11 Although to the best of my recollection no female goblins are mentioned in any of the Harry Potter books, I will
assume that they exist.

12 An additional complication arises from the nature of the sword as a magical object, not merely an artistic one. In the
Wizarding world, magical objects have, to varying degrees, at least a limited control over who can own and use them.
For example, magic wands behave differently depending on who they view as their true owner, and how their current
holder obtained them. See, e.g., DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 494 (“The wand chooses the wizard,” said
Ollivander. “That much has always been clear to those of us who have studied wandlore. . . . Subtle laws govern wand
ownership, but the conquered wand will usually bend its will to its new master.”). In an earlier book, the sword of
Gryffindor magically presented itself to Harry in his time of need. See CHAMBER OF SECRETS, supra note 9, at 319-20,
333-34. Indeed, Harry’s friend, Hermione Granger, uses this earlier event as an argument supporting Harry’s
ownership interest in the sword, but she is informed that “[a]ccording to reliable historical sources, the sword may
present itself to any worthy Gryffindor [House member].” DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 129. It has thus been
suggested that the rule of ownership in the wizarding world might be “in a magical system the ability to manifest an
object is prima facie evidence of rightful ownership.” Reply Posting of Eric j to Asymmetrical Information Blog,
http://www.janegalt.net/archives/000921.php#131305 (July 26, 2007 9:22 AM). But see Reply Posting of Mike S. to
system with controlled teleportation and sapient/semi-sapient magical artifacts of varying motivation . . ., I don’t
think a standard like that would be very practical.”). Resolving the ownership interests of such self-determining objects
raises some complex questions. Does the original owner lose his or her rights if the object chooses a new master? Or
does the original owner retain those rights, and the wizard receiving the object’s allegiance get only a limited right of
use, somewhat analogous to an easement? Because Muggle objects do not exhibit this property, and Muggle law
therefore does not take it into account, I will not explore this idea further.

13 Such free alienability of objects via sale is a strong value of our legal system—hence the classic statement that
restraints on alienation are “disfavored.” See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J.) (“[R]estrain[s] on alienation] are traditionally disfavored.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 143
(1983) (“Much of modern [real] property law operates on the assumption that freedom to alienate property interests
which one may own is essential to the welfare of society.”).
In this situation, the maker would retain an ownership interest in the object while, at the time of the grant, surrendering possession to the purchaser as the holder of the life estate. The maker would then be entitled to recover possession of the object upon the death of the life tenant. However, such a relationship in an artistic object would only be created by explicit agreement of the parties. In contrast, Bill’s statement suggests that goblins would automatically apply such a rule to all transactions involving goblin-made objects.

**Intellectual Property Law**

While fitting the goblin perspective into tangible property law is rather difficult, the intellectual property laws contain some closer parallels. One such parallel may be found in copyright law, under which some of the creator’s rights serve to limit the rights of the owner of a work. For example, the owner of a painting or sculpture has the right to display it in his or her home or other fixed location, or to resell it. However, that owner does not have the right to make and sell copies of the work or to transmit the image of the work over the television waves or the Internet, because the right to make and sell such copies and make such transmissions belongs to the holder of the copyright in the work (presumably, but not necessarily, the creator), rather than to the purchaser. Similar limits on copying and transmission apply to other protected works. Thus, even after a work leaves the artist’s hands, he or she retains a degree of control over its subsequent use.

Another interesting parallel is found in Section 203 of the Copyright Act, which provides that the creator of a work who has assigned the copyright in that work to another may terminate that assignment “at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant” and thus regain control of the rights in that work. To emphasize the importance of this ongoing right, the statute makes it inalienable: “Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.” Thus, even if the artist has explicitly agreed not to exercise the statutory right to terminate the assignment of copyright after thirty-five years, that agreement will not be enforced and the artist will be able to effect the termination. Although the purpose of these termination rights is largely economic—they are intended to “better insure that authors and their families are able to reap a fair portion of the benefits of the author’s creative efforts”—they still reflect a belief that a creator retains some connection to an artistic work even after it has passed out of his or her hands.

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14 See THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 34 (1984) (“The estate for life . . . is just about what its name implies—an estate the duration of which is measured by a human life.”); id. at 56 (“When the owner of an estate transfers a lesser estate [such as a life estate], the future estate the owner keeps is called a reversion.”).

15 The exact wording of the excerpt raises the interesting question of whether the goblin view of ownership applies to all transactions involving goblin artifacts, or only those between goblins and non-goblins. In other words, what happens when a goblin sells an artistic object to another goblin? Is that goblin free to pass it on to other goblins, or does the same limitation on resales apply? Are transactions to outsiders disfavored as against goblin public policy? Exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this essay.

16 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy [of the work] publicly . . . to viewers present at the place where the copy is located.”); id. § 109(a) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .”).

17 See id. § 106(1), (3), (5).

18 Id. § 203(a)(3).

19 Id. § 203(a)(5).

20 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENEILL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 472 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) (further noting that “Congress was concerned that authors had ‘unequal bargaining power’
However, there is at least one very important distinction between the regimes of intellectual property rights, as exemplified by this copyright example, and tangible property rights. Copyright law is concerned only with rights in the artistic design of the object, and not with the right to the physical possession of the tangible object embodying that design (leaving the latter to the realm of tangible property law). Thus, when an artist sells a painting or a sculptor a statue, the tangible object passes into the possession of the purchaser, while the copyright in the painting or statue remains with the artist or sculptor. The purchaser is then generally free to do what he or she wishes with the specific piece of art purchased. However, because the author retains the copyright, only he or she is entitled to reproduce the work, or transmit it, or prepare derivative works based on it. In contrast, goblins are specifically concerned with ownership of the tangible object itself, not merely of the rights in its design.

Another difficulty relates to the example of the goblin-made sword: Is it eligible for protection under copyright law at all? The Copyright Act specifically excludes from its coverage “useful articles,” which would seem to include a sword. However, the design for a useful article may be copyrightable “if, and only the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” Thus, if the design of the sword can be separated from its utilitarian purpose, it might be copyrightable. Given that swords are fundamentally utilitarian to begin with, and that the primary value of goblin swords resides in their unique practical properties, copyright protection seems unlikely. In any event, copyright law would almost certainly cover the goblin-made tiara that Griphook also covets, and so the essential point holds: Copyright law, in at least some cases, recognizes a creator’s ongoing interest in a creative work.

21 Section 202. Ownership of copyright as distinct from ownership of material object
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.


22 Unless, of course, the copyright has also been transferred via contract.

23 Subject to the limitations of the artist’s copyright in the work, as discussed supra, and of the artist’s moral rights in the work, as discussed infra.

24 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (2), (5). As noted above, although the copyright holder retains the display right in the work, id. § 106(5), the purchaser of the work is permitted “to display that copy publicly . . . to viewers present at the place where the copy is located,” id. § 109(c).

25 Section 101 of the Act defines “[p]ictorial, graphical, and sculptural works” to include “works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). It goes on to define “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” Id.

26 Id.; see also Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) (exploring the “physical separability” and “conceptual separability” analyses for determining the copyrightability of design aspects of useful articles).

27 See DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 303-04 (discussing the special powers of goblin swords).

28 Id. at 512, 517.

29 Others have connected this goblin view of property to copyright law, albeit with different intent. Several bloggers have compared this goblin view with that of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion
One other potential point of divergence between goblins’ views and intellectual (and tangible) property law merits discussion. Generally speaking, the rights discussed are personal to the creator of the work of art. However, as noted above, one reading of the goblin view of property is that it is not so limited: Gripphook appears to be asserting an ownership interest on behalf of all goblins for any object of goblin origin. While such an argument lacks a strong basis in current intellectual property law, it is actually not unlike the assertions that various ethnic and national groups make on behalf of their cultural forebears. This conception of a “cultural right” belonging to a group is discussed more fully below.  

Moral Rights Law

An even stronger recognition of the ongoing interest that the creator retains in a sold artistic object is found in the realm of moral rights. In contrast to copyright law, which is directed primarily toward protecting the economic interests of the creator, moral rights law is concerned

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30 They may also in some cases be heritable or devisable by the creator. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) (describing the passage of the termination right).

31 See infra notes 69-90 and accompanying text. This goblin view of societal ownership may also fit into a related modern critique of intellectual property law generally, which asserts that “all creations are largely the result of communal forces,” and thus attributing them to particular individuals is an incoherent and improper exercise. MURGESS ET AL., supra note 20, at 10 (citing THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi, eds., 1994); Peter Jaszi, Toward A Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992)).

32 One blog poster has also recognized this analogy. See Posting of jfpbookworm to Reddit.com, http://reddit.com/info/29i3x/comments (July 25, 2007) (response to Harry Potter and the Goblin’s Perpetual Copyright, stating “It’s more like an extreme version of the (European?) conception of moral rights.”).
with protecting the “personality” of the artist.33 Some of these moral rights are, like copyrights, limited to artistic rights and not the artistic object itself, but others extend to at least a limited control over that tangible object.

Moral rights find their roots in the continental European tradition. The leading country in the development of moral rights is France,34 where the concept originated and is known as the “droit moral,” a phrase with no literal English translation but “‘[s]piritual,’ ‘non-economic’ and ‘personal’ [right] convey something of the intended meaning.”35 Moral rights are an incarnation of the idea that artistic works are embodiments of the artist’s personality, and as such are worthy of protection against appropriation or distortion by others.36 As such, they are often deemed inalienable and unwaivable.37 Furthermore, “[i]n some countries moral rights are perpetual, lasting at least theoretically forever.”38

Such conceptions are largely alien to the traditions of the common law countries such as the United States, and thus moral rights are relative late-comers to these countries.39 Indeed, its reluctance to acknowledge these moral rights was for many years a major reason that the United States refused to join the Berne Convention, the primary international copyright treaty, which has as one of its provisions a requirement that member nations recognize certain moral rights in copyrighted works.40 The United States finally acquiesced and joined the Berne Convention in

33 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 20, at 519.
35 SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 456 (1987), quoted in Landers, supra note 34, at 166 n.4; see also Liemer, supra note 34, at 41-42 (“The French, the acknowledged leaders in this area of the law, generally call these ‘droits morals,’ which loosely translates as ‘moral rights.’” (footnote omitted)).
36 Historically, European nations created the concept of moral rights to protect works of the mind by recognizing that a work embodies an author’s personality. Moral rights protect this right of personality by protecting the artist’s work, which is seen as “an emanation or manifestation of [the artist’s] personality, as his ‘spiritual child.’” . . . [T]he artist has a legally protectible [sic] interest if that work is distorted or misrepresented by another.

Landers, supra note 34, at 169 (quoting RICKETSON, supra note 35, at 456).

The unique relationship between an artist, the creative process, and the resultant art makes an artist unusually vulnerable to certain personal harms. The art an artist produces is, in a sense, an extension of herself. The artists’ connection to her art is much more personal and simply qualitatively different from the relationship of most other people to other objects and activities.

Liemer, supra note 34, at 43 (footnote omitted).
37 Liemer, supra note 34, at 44 (“In some countries, an artist cannot waive moral rights.”).
38 Id. at 45 (footnote omitted) (further noting that “[i]n practical terms, they probably last as long as the art does.”).
39 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 20, at 519; see also, e.g., Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral Rights, 55 Am. J. Comp. L. 67, 67 (2007) (“It has long been a basic tenet of comparative copyright theory that American and European copyright systems differ primarily in their attitudes towards the protection of moral rights of authors, evidenced by the striking discrepancy between the rights traditionally granted to authors under the copyright statutes of most common law jurisdictions and the rights granted to them under the copyright statutes of many civil law countries.”); Liemer, supra note 34, at 42 (“Those schooled in the United States may find moral rights to be quite a foreign concept.”). Elliott C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual Artists: An Alien Concept, 40 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 265, 267 (1992) (“The resale royalty [one type of moral right, discussed infra] . . . is a foreign concept born of different social and legal systems, and is antithetical to the Anglo-American tradition of free alienability of property.”).
1988, but even then, it did not enact any new laws, arguing instead that an existing patchwork of laws in the Copyright and Lanham (Trademark) Acts was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Convention. In 1990, however, Congress finally put moral rights on a firmer footing by enacting the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), which explicitly recognized limited moral rights for “works of visual art.” In addition to this limited federal moral rights regime, many states recognize stronger forms of moral rights, with California being especially active in this area.

The basic moral rights, as required by the Berne Convention and recognized in § 106A of the Copyright Act, are the rights of attribution and integrity. Article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention provides:

Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.

Section 106A of the Copyright Act implements this provision by providing protection for these two basic moral rights. However, it is limited to “works of visual art,” defined in § 101 as:

- a painting, drawing, print, [still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,] or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author.

The definition goes on to exclude “any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication,” as well as “any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.”

*Right of Attribution*

The right of attribution is the artist’s right to have all his or her works and only his or her works attributed to him or her: “the author of a work of visual art—(1) shall have the right—(A) to claim authorship of that work, and (B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create.” As a corollary of this right, the author also has the right “to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial

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42 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
43 See Landers, supra note 34, at 181, 183.
44 Two other rights are generally added to this list of basic rights, the right to control disclosure and the right of withdrawal. See Landers, supra note 34, at 170; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1985).
45 Berne Convention art. 6bis(1).
47 Id. Thus, as discussed supra, if the goblin sword is not protectable under copyright law, it would not be entitled to federal moral rights protection, although the tiara likely would likely qualify as a work of visual art in the form of a sculpture.
48 Id. § 106A(a)(1).
to his or her honor or reputation.”

Although *Deathly Hallows* discusses no parallel right directly, Griphook’s attitude would certainly suggest that the goblins would insist that goblin-made objects be attributed to them, and that they would object to non-goblin-made objects being attributed to them.

**Right of Integrity**

The right of integrity is more directly parallel to the goblin conception of a continuing ownership interest in a tangible artistic object. Under the U.S. statute, the artist has the right

(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work [of visual art] which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and

(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.

The right of integrity thus grants the author some control over the tangible artistic object itself, even after it has been sold to another. The control is limited to prevention of certain types of “distortion, mutilation, or modification” and “destruction” (with the last applicable only to “a work of recognized stature”), and thus it is much weaker than the goblin right of return of the work upon the death of the purchaser (although a possible remedy for threatened destruction is return of the work to the author). However, the right of integrity is again consistent with the goblin notion that a creator, by virtue of the act of creation, maintains a linkage to and a degree of control over the created work, regardless of in whose hands the tangible work itself currently resides.

**Droit de Suite**

One final moral right that deserves mention is the “droit de suite,” also known as the resale royalty; indeed, this right perhaps comes the closest to the goblin conception of property (at least the individualized version as described by Bill). Pursuant to the droit de suite, an artist is entitled to a portion of the proceeds any time his or her fine art work is resold. These resale royalties are

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49 Id. § 106A(a)(2). Violations of VARA are treated as copyright infringements, and therefore evoke the same remedies. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“For purposes of this chapter [5—Copyright Infringement and Remedies] . . . , any reference to copyright shall be deemed to include the rights conferred by section 106A(a).”). The right of attribution is generally enforced by injunction, requiring the defendant either to associate or disassociate the artist’s name with the work, as appropriate under the circumstances. For example, in *Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass’n*, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court applied the New York’s Artists’ Authorship Rights Act, which has provisions similar to VARA, and concluded that presenting only unrepresentative fragments of an artist’s work in a pamphlet presented the work in an “altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form.” *See id.* at 134-41. As a remedy, the court awarded: (1) an injunction prohibiting distribution of the pamphlet in a way that suggested that the fragments represented the whole of the work; (2) an injunction requiring a “corrective communication” to “disattribute” the pamphlet from the artist; and (3) damages, limited to nominal damages of $1 because the artist had not shown the amount of damage to his reputation. *See id.* at 148-49.


51 Like the right of attribution, the right of integrity is generally enforced by an injunction against destruction or damage. *See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.*, 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (enjoining defendants from “(1) distorting, mutilating, or modifying plaintiffs’ art work . . . ; (2) destroying this art work; and/or (3) removing this art work, or any portion thereof”), *rev’d on other grounds*, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995). If the work has already been harmed or destroyed, the artist may be entitled to collect damages. *See Martin v. City of Indianapolis*, 4 F. Supp. 2d 808, 811-13 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (awarding artist statutory damages of $20,000 for city’s destruction of artist’s work of recognized stature, as well as costs and attorney’s fees), *aff’d* 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).

52 *See Merges et al., supra* note 20, at 933.
typically limited to works of fine art sold for above a threshold price, and they can be based on the entire resale price or on only the increase in value. This right is again strongly rooted in the continental European tradition and has had difficulty gaining traction in the common law countries. Different rationales have been presented for the right, including the assertions that the right to profit from resales gives artists an increased incentive to produce works of fine art; creators of works of fine art are at a disadvantage compared to authors and composers, who can profit by selling many copies of their works; fine artists enhance their reputations, and hence the value of their existing works, by producing later works, and they are therefore entitled to compensation for this increase in value; and allowing the purchaser to reap all the benefit of the increased value of the work is a form of unjust enrichment that comes at the expense of the original artist.

In the United States, only California has fully recognized such a right, in the form of the Resale Royalty Act. The California Resale Royalty Act applies to works of “fine art,” defined to be “an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass.” (footnote omitted) Under the Act, “[w]henever a work of fine art is sold . . . , the seller or the seller’s agent shall pay to the

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53 See Channah Farber, Advancing the Arts Community in New Mexico through Moral Rights and Droit de Suite: The International Impetus and Implications of Preemption Analysis, 36 N.M. L. Rev. 720 (2006) (“German artists are given one-fourth of the difference between the present and prior selling price, as opposed to a set percentage of the resale price, as in France.”) (footnote omitted); Alderman, supra note 39, at 279.


55 See Alderman, supra note 39, at 268 (“Since it has been argued that works of fine art are exploited with each sale, whether or not there is a profit, resale royalties rest on the desire to encourage artistic production by guaranteeing creators compensation, as with other economic rights.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 272-73 (“One can argue that the potential for increased remuneration is a potent incentive for further creation.”).

56 See id. at 273-74 (“Authors and composers receive royalties through reproduction and performance rights for all the copies of their works that are exploited. Visual artists, on the other hand, are paid only for the initial sale of their works and have commercially insignificant reproduction rights. And unfortunately, they lose their most remunerative right—that of public display—once they sell their creations.”) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 269-70 (attributing this rationale to French law).

57 See id. at 270 (“The artist’s royalty in Germany is premised on the belief that the increased value of a creation was always latent in it, and that increases in individual works are also due to the artist’s continuing body of work. Thus, the increase in value in a particular work over time is what the artist should have received originally. Artists are exploited, in this view, because a work’s true value is not realized until many years after its original sale, and without resale royalties the creators do not share in any appreciation.”) (footnotes omitted).

58 See id. at 271 (“In Belgium, the contract principles of changed circumstances and unjust enrichment underlie the royalty right. Based on the continuing relationship between the artist and those who purchase his work, it is believed that a subsequent seller should not benefit unjustly from any increased value in an artist’s work. Changed circumstances and unjust enrichment presuppose that value increases are not the result of any specific activity or ability of the owner of a work who, therefore, should not benefit at the creator’s expense.”) (footnote omitted). Alderman is generally critical of all these views, and opposed to the resale right. See generally id. See also Farber, supra note 53, at 731 (discussing criticism of California’s droit de suite law (citing 1 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 233, 238 (2d ed. 1987))).

59 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West ). Puerto Rico also recognizes this right. See Farber, supra note 53, at 731 (citing 31 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 1401). Georgia also recognizes a limited form of the right in art purchased by the state, if the right is provided for by contract. See GA. CODE ANN. § 8-5-7(a)(3) (providing that the artist retains, “[i]f provided by written contract, the right to receive a specified percentage of the proceeds if the work of art is subsequently sold by the state to a third party other than as part of the sale of the building in which the work of art is located”).

60 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(c)(2).
artist of such work of fine art or to such artist’s agent 5 percent of the amount of such sale.”\(^{61}\)

The right is inalienable\(^ {62}\) and persists for the life of the artist, then “inure[s] to his or her heirs, legatees, or personal representative” for an additional 20 years.\(^ {63}\) However, it is limited and does not apply to “the resale of a work of fine art for a gross sales price of less than one thousand dollars ($1,000)\(^ {64}\) or to “resale of the work of fine art for a gross sales price less than the purchase price paid by the seller.”\(^ {65}\)

The droit de suite thus incorporates many of the features that Bill attributes to the goblin view of ownership of works of art. The creator maintains an ongoing economic interest in the work,\(^ {66}\) as subsequent sales of the work require a direct payment to the creator.\(^ {67}\) Since goblins “consider our habit of keeping goblin-made objects, passing them from wizard to wizard without further payment, little more than theft,”\(^ {68}\) a system that requires payment of a royalty on each such transfer fits splendidly with their view of property (although they would probably want more than California’s 5% royalty).

### Cultural Rights

Recently, interest had been growing in a proposed collective moral right, termed a “cultural right.” Under the aegis of such a cultural right, Native Americans have demanded the return of artistic and cultural artifacts residing in U.S. museums, and the Greek government has demanded that the British government return the “Elgin Marbles” friezes and statuary taken from the Parthenon in 1806.\(^ {69}\) In these cases, it is not the actual artists, or even necessarily their direct

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\(^{61}\) Id. § 986(a). The obligation is on the seller or his or her agent to “withhold 5 percent of the amount of the sale, locate the artist and pay the artist.” Id. § 986(a)(1).

\(^{62}\) Id. § 986(a) (“The right of the artist to receive an amount equal to 5 percent of the amount of such sale may be waived only by a contract in writing providing for an amount in excess of 5 percent of the amount of such sale.”).

\(^{63}\) Id. § 986(a)(7).

\(^{64}\) Id. § 986(b)(2).

\(^{65}\) Id. § 986(b)(4). Note that if the sale price is greater than the purchase price by less than 5%, the seller actually takes a loss on the transaction.

\(^{66}\) See Alderman, supra note 39, at 267 (“The resale royalty, or droit de suite... pos[its] a continuing remunerative relationship between a visual artist and his creation, surviving the sale of the material object embodying the work...”). id. at 276 (“This [droit de suite] concept fits easily within the European natural law systems that recognize a continuing relationship between an artist and his work, even after sale. Consistent with this view, possession of art is not like owning a widget: even after a work is sold it remains under the influence of its creator.” (footnote omitted)).

\(^{67}\) Although by its terms the Resale Royalty Act applies only to actual resales (and exchanges for other fine art, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(b)(5)), the logic of the Act suggests that it should apply to any transfer of the property, such as via a will, just as tax laws do.

\(^{68}\) Deathly Hallows, supra note 1, at 517.

Commentators have proposed various definitions for cultural property, accompanied by a similar variety of rationales for its protection. According to Professor Patty Gerstenblith,

“cultural property” refers to those objects that are the product of a particular group or community and embody some expression of that group’s identity, regardless of whether the object has achieved some universal recognition of its value beyond that group. . . . To achieve the purposes of the personality theory of property ownership [adopted in the article] and to ensure that the group has the opportunity to define itself autonomously, the cultural group must provide the definition of its cultural property.71

She then goes on to identify the grounds for protecting such property:

Once a group designates items of property as cultural property, the rights of cultural groups may be founded on three ideas. First, because the identity of the group is bound up in the object (and similarly, the identity of the object relies on recognition by the group), the group acquires ownership rights over that object. Second, because the property is so closely tied to the identity of the group, it should be inalienable “because future generations are unable to consent to transactions that threaten their existence as a group.” Finally, group ownership may also be premised on a Lockean theory. Cultural groups have rights in their cultural property because such property is the product of the group.72

The most significant international treaty on cultural property, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (UNESCO Convention),73

personhood” (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982)); also arguing that rights based on this theory should be inalienable). But see Harding, Native American Cultural Property, supra note 69, at 750-53 (criticizing Moustakas). Professor Harding also cites the Dead Seas Scrolls as another example of cultural property. See Harding, Cultural Heritage, supra note 69, at 295 & n.13.

70 Such an orderly transfer of title is not typical for the works usually under discussion—the Elgin Marbles in particular have a rather dicey history. See John Henry Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1881, 1881-84, 1895-1902 (1985) (discussing the history of the Elgin Marbles and the complexities in determining whether Britain can legitimately claim title to the pieces). Gryffindor’s sword is the subject of similar discussions regarding its rightful ownership. See DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 505-08 (goblins and wizards arguing over whether Gryffindor commissioned the sword from the goblins or whether he simply stole it from them).

71 Gerstenblith, supra note 69, at 569-70.

72 Id. at 570 (quoting Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 Can. J.L. & Juris. 249, 263 (1993)). Professor Gerstenblith concludes her article with a model statute for the comprehensive protection of cultural property in the United States. See id. at 641-70; see also id. at 673-88 (Appendix A, draft text for a Model Statute for the Treatment and Protection of Cultural and Archaeological Resources).

states “[f]or the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘cultural property’ means property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and which belongs to [particular designated] categories.” The designated categories include such things as specimen collections, artifacts of historical interest, archaeological discoveries, parts of monuments, artistic works and manuscripts, and archives. The Preamble to the UNESCO Convention lays out the considerations that justify the protection of cultural property: “[T]he interchange of cultural property among nations for scientific, cultural and educational purposes increases the knowledge of the civilization of Man, enriches the cultural life of all peoples and inspires mutual respect and appreciation among nations,” and “cultural property constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization and national culture, and that its true value can be appreciated only in relation to the fullest possible information regarding is origin, history and traditional setting.” The Preamble then concludes that “it is incumbent upon every State to protect the cultural property existing within its territory against the dangers of theft, clandestine excavation, and illicit export,” and that “to avert these dangers, it is essential for every State to become increasingly alive to the moral obligations to respect its own cultural heritage and that of all nations.” Article 2 of the Convention goes on to declare:

The States Parties to this Convention recognize that the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property is one of the main causes of the impoverishment of the cultural heritage of the countries of origin of such property and that international co-operation constitutes one of the most efficient means of protecting each country’s cultural property against all the dangers resulting there from.

Article 3 contains the primary substantive provision of the Convention: “The import, export or transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the provisions adopted under this Convention by the States Parties thereto, shall be illicit.” The rest of the Convention then goes on to specify the conditions under which the import and export of cultural property is legal or illegal.

Professor John Merryman states the definition this way: “The term [‘cultural property’] refers to objects that have artistic, ethnographic, archaeological, or historical value.” He goes on to note “[m]ost nations control cultural property in the interest of its retention, preservation, study, enjoyment, and exploitation.” Professor Merryman takes a different view from most

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74 UNESCO Convention, supra note 73, art. 1.
75 See id.
76 See id., Preamble.
77 See id.
78 Id., art. 2.
79 Id., art. 3.
80 See id., arts. 4-26.
81 Merryman, supra note 70, at 1888.
82 Id. Professor Merryman explores this notion further:

These interests may reinforce each other: for example, Mayan sites in Mexico are more likely to be preserved if monumental Mayan sculptures cannot be exported to foreign markets. There are situations, however, in which the preservation of cultural objects is actually endangered by retentive legislation: objects that would be well-housed and preserved abroad are allowed to deteriorate in warehouses or inadequately maintained and staffed museums or, often worse, at unprotected and unexcavated sites at home. In such cases the retention and preservation interests work against each other.
commentators in the cultural rights field on why and how to protect cultural property. Instead of a “cultural nationalism” view of the rights, under which a culture or nation has a group right to demand the return of its cultural property, he favors “cultural internationalism,” under which cultural property should be protected because it is important to the cultural identity of all humankind, not just the group that created it. On this theory, there is no particular rationale for favoring the originating culture over any other; rather, the important consideration is who is in the best position to preserve the property.

Another view of cultural rights (not necessarily inconsistent with the previous views) is that they are needed to fill gaps in the coverage of traditional copyright and moral rights laws. In many indigenous cultures, knowledge and creation are viewed as communal in nature, and therefore no individual “author” can be identified, as required for both copyrights and moral rights. Further, many indigenous works are not written or otherwise fixed, again as required by copyright and moral rights law. In response, there have been proposals to create what have been termed “Indigenous Communal Moral Rights.” Such proposals recognize the communal nature of these creations and protect them with communal moral rights.

Although not necessarily in keeping with Bill’s assertion of what goblins believe, with its implicitly economic motive in wanting another fee paid for each transfer of the artistic object, this cultural moral right is perfectly consistent with what Griphook is demanding when he says of the sword, “It is a lost treasure, a masterpiece of goblinwork! It belongs with the goblins!” He is asserting the right in what he sees as an important cultural artifact, the sword (and, presumably, the tiara), on behalf of the goblins as a cultural or racial group, much as the Greek government demands return of the Elgin Marbles on behalf of the Greek people or Native Americans demand the return of tribal artifacts on behalf of the tribe. Thus, Griphook would appear to be demanding recognition of the goblins’ cultural rights in their historical artifacts.

Are We Becoming Goblins?

The current law of intellectual property, and even more so the law of moral rights, thus bear some significant parallels to the goblin view of property, albeit with some important differences.

Id. at 1888-89 (footnote omitted).

83 See id. at 1911-16.

84 See id. at 1916-21.

85 See id. He therefore favors a principle of “repose”—an artifact should remain where it currently resides unless there is a good reason to move it. See id. at 1911; see also id. at 1921 (applying cultural internationalism and repose to conclude that the Elgin Marbles should remain in Britain).

86 See Kingsbury, supra note 69, at 163-64 & passim.

87 See id. at 163.

88 See id. at 163.

89 See id. at 168-70 (discussing proposed legislation in Australia that would recognize rights under this name). Although the author criticizes the Australian legislation for being too limited, she does note that:

Despite the limitations of the draft Bill, Australia has taken an important initiative in pioneering Indigenous Communal Moral Rights. Australia has effectively reconceptualised moral rights (admittedly in this limited context), so that they protect not the author but the community. This is a concept far removed from the original author-centred notion of moral rights in civil law systems. It demonstrates the flexibility of the moral rights framework, and its ability to deal with cultural rather than economic harm.

Id. at 171 (footnote omitted). See also Reppas, supra note 69, at 932-34 (arguing that the Greek’s have a group moral right of integrity in the Parthenon that requires Britain to return the Elgin Marbles so that the monument may be properly restored).

90 DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 1, at 506.
These parallels raise the interesting question of whether we are in the process of eroding away those differences and moving toward a more “goblinish” view of artistic property.

The overall thrust in the intellectual property area, especially in the area of copyrights and other artistic rights, has clearly been in the direction of expanding those rights. The same trend appears in moral rights; indeed, the United States did not even formally recognize such rights until VARA in 1990, and many commentators argue that even that Act does not meet the requirements of the Berne Convention and that the United States should therefore expand its recognition of moral rights further, in keeping with the continental moral rights tradition. More states are creating their own moral rights regimes, and states that already have those regimes are expanding their scope. If these trends continue, they are likely to take us ever closer to a goblin-like view of artistic property, where the moral rights of the creator overcome the traditional property rights of the purchaser.

91 Along with a great many others, I have made this point before. See Gary Pulsinelli, Freedom to Explore: Using the Eleventh Amendment to Liberate Researchers from Liability for Intellectual Property Infringements, 82 WASH. L. REV. 275, 357 & n.443 (providing examples, including the increase in copyright term); id. at 360-63 (discussing copyright specifically, and citing such example as the addition of protection for sound recordings and architectural works, new rights in digital sound recordings, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).

92 See Rigamonti, supra note 39, at 67 (noting that the article explores the reasons behind “[t]he recent wave of moral rights legislation in common law countries”); Liemer, supra note 34, at 42 (“In the United States, moral rights are in a much earlier state of development and are currently undergoing an important transition. This transition may, in part, reveal changing cultural values . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Farber, supra note 53, at 747 (“As internationalization of the art world continues and the intellectual property law in the United States adapts accordingly, state [moral rights] law will continue to develop as well.”). As noted above, the European Union has issued a directive requiring all its members to adopt the droit de suite. See E.U. Droit de Suite Directive, supra note 54.

[T]he explosive growth of the Internet and online services and technological tools that allow users to access and manipulate creative works directly has resulted in growing international pressures on the U.K. and the U.S. to move toward greater recognition of, and respect for, moral rights, including for musical works. In accordance with these aforementioned international agreements, other common law nations, such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have already adopted broader statutory schemes granting moral rights for creative works, including moral rights for music.

Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and the United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities under the U.K.’s New Performances Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 215-16 (2006). It may be that this forced imposition of the droit de suite on a reluctant Great Britain is behind Rowling’s exposition of goblinish property rules. Even in France, the leader in the area of moral rights, the concept is only a little more than 100 years old. See Landers, supra note 34, at 169.

93 See generally, e.g., Landers, supra note 34 (criticizing various sections of VARA as too limited); Elizabeth Dillinger, Mutating Picasso: The Case for Amending the Visual Artists Rights Act to Provide Protection of Moral Rights after Death, 75 UMKC L. REV. 897 (2007); Kimberly Y.W. Holst, A Case of Bad Credit?: The United States and the Protection of Moral Rights in Intellectual Property Law, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105 (2006); Sarah C. Anderson, Decontextualization of Musical Works: Should the Doctrine of Moral Rights Be Extended?, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 869 (2006); see also Farber, supra note 53, at 741 (arguing that “[t]here is a strong possibility that Congress may indeed enact a federal resale royalty law,” in light of recent harmonization of the right in the European Union).

94 Compare Landers, supra note 34, at 183 & n.124 (identifying eleven states with moral rights legislation prior to the enactment of VARA in 1990) with 6 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBL. & THE ARTS § 16:103 & n.1 (3d ed. updated August 2007) (identifying fourteen states—California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island—with moral rights legislation in 2007) and Farber, supra note 58, at 731-32 (identifying Montana and Utah as also having recognized limited moral rights, but omitting Illinois, Nevada, and Oregon; also arguing that “New Mexico should consider expanding its moral rights law to encompass a broader range of subject matter and to apply in contexts other than works of art that are incorporated into public buildings.”). This number is probably less than it might otherwise have been because VARA includes a preemption provision that may have discouraged states from passing their own regimes. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f).
What would be the implications of a full-fledged goblinish rights regime, where the seller is entitled to the return of the work upon the death of the purchaser? One issue with such a regime would be the scope of the works covered. The conventional moral rights provisions are all focused on protecting the creative work of a single artist (or at most a small group of artists); indeed, the VARA definition of “artistic works” specifically excludes corporate “works for hire” from its scope.95 Thus, a company like Tiffany’s would not be able to regain possession of one of its fine necklaces or bracelets upon the death of the purchaser. Instead, the sort of works that might be included in such a regime would most likely be limited to highly individual pieces of fine art or craftsmanship—like a particularly fine sword or tiara.

Such a regime would certainly raise some interesting economic questions. If the purchaser of a work of art knows that the transaction is more in the way of a rental than a traditional purchase arrangement, then he or she will almost certainly not be willing to pay the same price as for an outright ownership interest. In this sense, such a view of artistic property rights might actually be disadvantageous to the artist, as he or she will receive less money up front. In theory, this disadvantage will be overcome by the right to make subsequent sales once the property is returned from the purchaser. However, such subsequent sales are far from a sure thing—the work might not change hands during the artist’s lifetime, and even if it does, very few works increase in value or even hold their original value over time, as fashions and taste change.96

A goblinish regime would also raise some profound practical problems. As long as the artist is alive at the time of return of the work, then identifying the holder of the right is likely to be relatively easy.97 But what if the artist has died in the interim? If the right is perpetual,98 the passage of time will make tracking down the original creator, and then his or her successors in interest, progressively more difficult. And who would those successors in interest be? Traditional moral rights are inalienable, in large part due to their fundamental link to the personality of the creator, but also because making them freely assignable would effectively defeat their purpose—the purchaser of the work could, as a term of the purchase, demand transfer of the moral rights as well.99 Indeed, the rights afforded by § 203 of the Copyright Act (providing for the termination of copyright assignment agreements) are not even devisable—they pass to the heirs of the artist according to strict rules spelled out in the statute.100 Tracking the creator’s rights through the generations descending from the creator is likely to prove impossible.101

One way around this difficulty is to make the right an individual right for the lifetime of the creator (plus perhaps some limited time longer102), and then make it a collective cultural right

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96 Similar arguments have been advanced against the droit de suite. See generally, e.g., Alderman, supra note 39.
97 Although finding him or her may not be—witness the difficulty created by so-called “orphan works,” works that are still under copyright but for which the owner of the copyright cannot be found, leaving potential users uncertain of their ability to use the work without liability. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf.
98 As the goblin right appears to be—as noted above, the sword at issue was at least a thousand years old (and the tiara is of a similar age), but the Griphook asserted that it still belonged to the goblins.
99 They are, however, in some cases waivable. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (providing for written waiver of the rights granted in that section).
101 In this sense, a corporate right might actually be more suited to this goblin property right, as corporations have ongoing existence unrelated to the Muggles who own and operate them. On the other hand, corporations also dissolve and disappear with some regularity, which would raise even more complex questions about who would qualify as their “descendants.”
102 As with the copyright, which extends for the life of the creator plus 70 years, 17 U.S.C. § 302, or the California resale royalty, which extends for the life of the creator plus 20 years, CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a)(7).
thereafter. Griphook’s actual claim on the goblin sword would appear to be of this collective nature—he is asserting the right on behalf of the race of goblins because he is a member of the race, not because he is himself a descendant of the actual creator. As noted above, such a claim is consistent with many forms of the proposed cultural moral right. In the modern world of globalism and increased sensitivity to other cultures, the recognition of such a right seems increasingly plausible. Indeed, recognition of cultural property is perhaps the most rapidly expanding area of moral rights law.\textsuperscript{103}

In fact, recognition of such a moral claim occurred recently, albeit by private parties rather than a governmental body. Yale University recognized the claim of the Peruvian government to cultural artistic objects (‘silver statues, jewelry, musical instruments’\textsuperscript{104}) that had been collected from the Machu Picchu site in Peru and that were then residing in Yale’s Peabody Museum.\textsuperscript{105} Yale agreed to return the artifacts to Peru for display in a new museum to be built near the site. According to the parties’ press release:

Yale will acknowledge Peru’s title to all the excavated objects including the fragments, bones and specimens from Machu Picchu. Simultaneously, in the spirit of collaboration, Peru will share with Yale rights in the research collection, part of which will remain at Yale as objects of ongoing research. Once the Museum and Research Center is ready for operation in late 2009, the museum quality objects will return to Peru along with a portion of the research collection.\textsuperscript{106}

Yale President Richard Levin stated that the arrangement was a “model for the handling of cultural artifacts that are important for scholarship on the one hand and important sources of pride for the home country… The key breakthrough, of course, is that we can at once recognize that the Peruvians are the owners of this material.”\textsuperscript{107} On the other side, Jose Keplan, a representative for the local government of Machu Picchu who was an advisor to the Peruvian negotiators, explicitly invoked the language of cultural rights, reportedly saying “repatriation of the antiquities goes beyond the technicalities of who possesses property… It boils down the ethical rights of

\textsuperscript{103} See, e.g., Harding, Cultural Heritage, supra note 69, at 296-97 (“There are an increasing number of examples of cooperation between museums and claimants and between collecting and source nations. This cooperation is founded at least partially on a mutual understanding of the significance of certain objects and a sense of obligation to the integrity of the objects themselves.” (footnotes omitted)); Reppas, supra note 69, at 64 (“An emerging norm in contemporary international law, in regards to the return of Cultural Property to its countries of origin, may be seen through an analysis of the numerous international treaties and agreements which expressly deal with this subject. These agreements show a trend in the world community to recognize the right of countries of origin to repatriate their Cultural Property which has been taken abroad, by establishing a procedure for and providing a means by which such property is returned.”); Gerstenblith, supra note 69, at 565 (“[P]rotection of our indigenous cultures has become progressively stronger over the course of this century…”); Phelan, supra note 69, at 64 (“[I]n recent years Congress and state legislatures have recognized the importance of identifying and preserving our cultural heritage and have enacted legislation to initiate and promote such an endeavor [i.e., to preserve objects and monuments of artistic, historical, literary, and anthropological interest].”). See also Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural Property, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 293 (1994) (proposing further expansion of cultural rights in the realm of intangible cultural property).


\textsuperscript{105} The Peruvian government also asserted a more traditional legal claim to the property, based on agreements signed at the time the artifacts were excavated. Such claims are common in cultural rights cases, including that of the Elgin Marbles. However, the rules governing ownership of excavated artifacts in this older time were rather fluid, as are details of what actually went on so long ago, and so the moral rights claim is often more clear-cut.

\textsuperscript{106} News Release, Yale University, Joint Statement by the Government of Peru and Yale University (Sept. 14, 2007), available at http://www.yale.edu/opa/newsr/07-09-14-01.all.html.

\textsuperscript{107} Orson, supra note 104.
the country of origin.”

The parties go so far as to propose, “[t]his understanding represents a new model of international cooperation providing for the collaborative stewardship of cultural and natural treasures.” The parties thus recognized the growing importance of cultural rights, and the trend toward recognizing the rights of cultural groups in their artifacts.

Even earlier, the U.S. Congress recognized the cultural claims of Native American tribes in the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).

The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) was enacted on November 16, 1990, as a way to correct past abuses to, and guarantee protection for, the human remains and cultural objects of Native American tribal culture. The Act addresses two main objectives: to protect Native American or Native Hawaiian ownership rights to items of cultural significance to them and burial sites on federal and tribal lands, and to provide for the repatriation of culturally significant items currently held by federal agencies and museums.

NAGPRA provides that “[t]he ownership or control of Native American cultural items which are excavated or discovered on Federal or tribal lands after November 16, 1990, shall be [with Native American tribes].” The primary focus of NAGPRA is human remains and associated funerary objects, but it also protects “cultural items” generally, which is defined to also include “unassociated funerary objects,” “sacred objects,” and “cultural patrimony.”

Furthermore, Federal agencies and museums with collections of “Native American human remains and associated funerary objects” are required to inventory their holdings and, if possible, “identify the geographical and cultural affiliation of such item.” If they are able to identify these affiliations, the agencies and museums must “upon the request of a known lineal descendant of the Native American or of the tribe or organization . . . expeditiously return such remains and associated funerary objects.” Thus, the United States has formally recognized cultural rights for artistic objects created by Native American tribes, at least with respect to such items discovered on federal lands or held by federal agencies or museums.

108 Id.

109 News Release, supra note 106.


112 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a). The statute then provides a hierarchy for determining which particular tribe or group receives the ownership right. See id.

113 Id. § 3001(3). “Cultural patrimony” is defined to mean an object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American group or culture itself, rather than property owned by an individual Native American, and which, therefore, cannot be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by any individual regardless of whether or not the individual is a member of the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and such object shall have been considered inalienable by such Native American group at the time the object was separated from such group.

114 Id. § 3003(a).

115 Id. § 3005(a)(1).

116 Australia and New Zealand, two other common-law countries, have also dealt with the issue of the cultural rights of indigenous peoples, with Australia going so far as to propose the creation of “Indigenous Communal Moral Rights.”
The issue of cultural property has also been addressed at the international level, leading to a series of accords regarding the treatment of such property. The oldest of these treaties is the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,\(^{117}\) which was intended to prevent the seizure and/or destruction of important monuments and other cultural property during wartime. This was followed by what is probably the most significant international treaty on cultural property, the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,\(^ {118}\) enacted in 1970. The UNESCO Convention requires member nations to ban the export of cultural property without the authorization of the country of origin. The United States ratified the UNESCO Convention with the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act in 1983,\(^ {119}\) which permits the president to enter into bilateral agreements to implement the export restrictions of the UNESCO Convention.

Other international agreements aim at fostering international cooperation to protect cultural rights, using a variety of different (largely hortatory) approaches. These include the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage\(^ {120}\) and the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.\(^ {121}\) More recent attempts include the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage,\(^ {122}\) the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage,\(^ {123}\) and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.\(^ {124}\) Indeed, culture property has become so significant a part of the international legal landscape that it now has its own dedicated journal, the *International Journal of Cultural Property*.\(^ {125}\)

However, broad cultural rights also present some practical difficulties. One such difficulty is the effect on the future viability of museums. If cultural rights force museums to submit to the

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\(^{118}\) UNESCO Convention, supra note 73. The provisions of the UNESCO Convention are discussed supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.


\(^{122}\) Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, June 24, 1995, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1322 (1995). The possible application of these agreements to the Elgin marbles is discussed in Reppas, supra note 69, at 959-61. Reppas also argues that “Collectively, . . . these treaties, in conjunction with other international agreements, establish a peremptory norm in contemporary international law which cannot be ignored by any country, irrespective of whether or not they are a party to these agreements.” Id. at 962.

\(^{123}\) Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1322 (1995). The possible application of these agreements to the Elgin marbles is discussed in Reppas, supra note 69, at 959-61. Reppas also argues that “Collectively, . . . these treaties, in conjunction with other international agreements, establish a peremptory norm in contemporary international law which cannot be ignored by any country, irrespective of whether or not they are a party to these agreements.” Id. at 962.


\(^{125}\) See http://www.journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=JCP.
demands of governments and ethnic groups for the return of their cultural artifacts, then the collections of many important museums will be drastically impoverished.126 Thus, the ironic result of an increased recognition of the importance of other cultures may be a decreased ability to learn about those cultures, because the decline of the museum will close one of the major cultural educational avenues.127

Other practical difficulties with broad cultural rights also present themselves. If the U.S. government were to extend the NAGPRA concept to create a similar action for artifacts dug on private lands or held by private citizens, it would have to contend with the argument that such an action amounts to a taking under the 5th Amendment.128 That brings up the general issue of compensation to the current owner—should the cultures demanding return of their artifacts have to pay some approximation of market value (assuming such a value could even be theoretically determined for unique antiquities) to get back the items? Or should these cultures have an absolute right in the object, entitling them to return without payment?

Another important issue is time limits: How old does an object have to get before it becomes a “cultural artifact”? At what point should the cultural right be recognized? Declaring an object of relatively recent vintage, whose artist is still alive or has only been dead a relatively short time, a “cultural artifact” might, in many cases, seem very strange, unless the object had attained some sort of special recognition or status in the culture. On the other hand, for works of indigenous peoples following ancient methods of craftsmanship, such craft objects might quickly attain the “cultural artifact” status.

Finally, there is the issue of who then controls the right. The idea of a cultural work exercised by a cultural group may be acceptable in the case of indigenous peoples with a strong cultural identity, such as native American tribes. It may also work for a case such as the Greek government claiming the return of Greek artifacts. However, the concept becomes more elusive when the creator does not clearly belong to a particular group—are there such things as “U.S. artifacts”?129

While we may be becoming more goblinish in recognizing ongoing rights in artistic objects, including allowing the artist to collect a commission on subsequent resale of the work, practical

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126 See Merryman, supra note 70, at 1895. According to Professor Merryman:

[T]he Elgin Marbles dramatically illustrate an important fact: the Metropolitan Museum in New York, the British Museum in London, the Louvre in Paris, the Hermitage in Leningrad and indeed all of the great Western museums contain vast collections of works from other parts of the world. If the principle were established that works of foreign origin should be returned to their sources, as Third World nations increasingly demand in UNESCO and other international fora, the holdings of the major Western museums would be drastically depleted.

Id.; see also Reppas, supra note 69, at 978-79 (acknowledging the risk, but dismissing its importance).

Id. There is an international interest in the accessibility of cultural property to all people. That policy is advanced by distribution, rather than retention in one place, of the works of a culture. If all the works of the great artists of classical Athens were returned to and kept there, the rest of the world would be culturally impoverished.

Merryman, supra note 70, at 1920-21 (footnote omitted).

128 See Gersteinblith, supra note 69, at 661-70 (discussing the takings issue, and exploring rationales under which the repatriation of cultural property may be deemed not to be a taking).

129 But see John Nivala, Droit Patrimoine: The Barnes Collection, the Public Interest, and Protecting Our Cultural Inheritance, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 477 (2003). Nivala claims that the Barnes Collection of art, as a complete set, is the cultural property of the United States, and that breaking up the collection would cause cultural harm. He argues that it should therefore be protected as an intact set via some form of cultural rights, which he calls a “collective droit patrimoine,” id. at 481. The French “droit patrimoine” corresponds to what is in English called the right of attribution, the right to claim authorship or “patrimony.” See also Craig M. Bargher, 4 DePaul J. Art & Ent. L. 189 (1994) (arguing that the United States should tighten its export laws to preserve its cultural property).
and social considerations suggest that we are unlikely to go as far as recognizing a permanent personal right in the creator that lets him or her reclaim such an object after a sale or other transfer is made. However, we may be moving closer to recognizing at least some form of the collective right that Griphook actually seems to be demanding, a cultural moral right in important cultural objects that enables the descendants of that culture as a group to demand the return of the object. Thus, we Muggles may not be as far from the goblins as we may have at first believed.