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Tennessee Law Review

Imad S. Matini

Document Type

Article

Abstract

Motions to reconsider-filed under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--are often considered one in the same, whether due to imprudent labeling by a litigant or due to the belief that little distinction exists between the two. In the context of habeas corpus petitions filed by pro se prisoners, motions under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) are often interchangeably filed. Within this context, however, the following issue persists: whether a motion filed under either rule is subject to the "second or successive" restriction under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The Supreme Court of the United States partially resolved this issue in Gonzalez v. Crosby. There, the Court held that a motion filed under Rule 60(b) that advances a claim is subject to the second or successive limitation under the AEDPA.

Despite the Court's holding in Crosby, debate persists over whether the second or successive limitation under AEDPA should be extended to motions filed under Rule 59(e). Indeed, a circuit split has developed over this issue. Some courts argue that a timely Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive petition if it advances a "Claim," as analyzed under Crosby, while others believe this motion is not a second or successive petition, whether or not it advances a claim.

Proponents of the latter belief have argued that Crosby should not be extended to motions under Rule 59(e) when that motion is filed during a litigant's initial habeas petition. Why? Because that motion arguably relates to a petitioner's one complete opportunity to seek collateral relief, as provided under the AEDPA. This Article echoes this argument, asserting that Crosby should not apply to motions under Rule 59(e), whether they advance a claim or not, because such motions are part and parcel of a party's one, entitled-to-attempt at pursuing habeas relief under the AEDPA.

Publication Date

2016

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