THE CASE AGAINST PRUDENTIAL STANDING: EXAMINING THE COURTS' USE OF PRUDENTIAL STANDING BEFORE AND AFTER LEXMARK

Authors

Kylie Chiseul Kim

Document Type

Article

Abstract

Through Lujan and Lexmark, Justice Scalia constructed one of his greatest legacies: a sound and manageable definition of standing. However, a threat to this legacy, prudential standing, persists after his death. Lujan defines standing-in simplified terms-as injury, causation, and redressability. Lexmark undermines prudential standing, which exceeds Lujan's definition of standing and which encompasses the rule against assertion of a generalized grievance, assertion of an interest outside the zone of interests protected by the law invoked, and assertion of the right of a third party. Despite these cases, lower courts continue to use prudential standing, confusing standing's definition. Arguing for a definitive end to prudential standing, this article explains its creation as a misinterpretation of precedent and explains the problem inherent in each rule of prudential standing. In addition to arguing for strict adherence to Lujan and Lexmark, this article proposes other means to eliminate prudential standing- (1) using the correct definitions for jurisdiction, for standing, for a right to sue, for a cause of action, and for a claim for relief and (2) using correct procedural principles to enforce the otherwise valid rules mislabeled as prudential standing.

Recommended Citation

Kim, Kylie Chiseul (2017) "THE CASE AGAINST PRUDENTIAL STANDING: EXAMINING THE COURTS' USE OF PRUDENTIAL STANDING BEFORE AND AFTER LEXMARK," Tennessee Law Review: Vol. 85: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/tennesseelawreview/vol85/iss1/7

Publication Date

2017