Document Type
Article
Publication Title
University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper Series
Abstract
This Article uses public choice theory and the new institutionalism to discuss the incentives, proclivities, and shared backgrounds of lawyers and judges. In America every law-making judge has a single unifying characteristic, each is a former lawyer. This shared background has powerful and unexplored effects on the shape and structure of American law. This Article argues that the shared characteristics, thought-processes, training, and incentives of Judges and lawyers lead inexorably to greater complexity in judge-made law. These same factors lead to the following prediction: judge-created law will be most complex in areas where a) elite lawyers regularly practice; b) judges may have a personal preference in the case that can be written-around by way of legal complexity; and c) the subject area interests the judge, or is generally considered prestigious. The Article uses the law of standing as a case study.
Publication Date
6-2008
Recommended Citation
Barton, Benjamin H., "Judges, Lawyers, and a Predictive Theory of Legal Complexity" (2008). Scholarly Works. 237.
https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs/237