Abstract
Climate change continues to present mounting physical, transitional, and litigation risks for the private sector. Recognizing this threat, shareholders are increasingly pushing for corporate fiduciaries to embrace the transition to net-zero emissions by reallocating and transforming existing assets and operations. While some companies are aligning their corporate behavior with a pro-regulatory framework, others are engaging in efforts to promote disinformation, elevate anti-regulatory politicians, and thwart transitional legislation through the use of direct lobbying and trade association involvement. Such lobbying could result in greater transitional and litigation-based risks for the company.
This Article attempts to map a practical approach for shareholders wishing to hold corporate fiduciaries accountable for lobbying inconsistently with shareholder expectations. By relying on data indicating an increase in public and shareholder sentiment toward aligning with the transition, as well as by analyzing recent developments in both SEC regulation over climate disclosures and the expansion of Delaware oversight law, this Article addresses the feasibility of pursuing Caremark oversight claims via derivative shareholder litigation.
Recommended Citation
Joseph H. Garloch, Liability For The Lobbyist: How Corporate Oversight Can Quell Dissident Lobbying Efforts In The Realm Of Climate Change, 26 Tenn. J. Bus. L. () , DOI: https://doi.org/10.70658/4486-1457.1702https://ir.law.utk.edu/transactions/vol26/iss1/4